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APPLYING THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC WELFARE

CONTEXT
AMIAD KUSHNER*
As corporate scandals have returned to the front pages, it may be
an appropriate time to reconsider the responsible corporate officer
("RCO") doctrine, a striking yet seldom-used innovation in the
criminal law. 1 The doctrine holds a corporate officer vicariously
liable for the criminal violation of a subordinate, where the officer
occupies a position of responsibility and authority in the corporation,
has the power to prevent the violation, and fails to do so.2 It imposes
liability upon officers for the illegal acts of other corporate agents,
without proof that the officers directly participated in or authorized
the crime. 3 The doctrine presents an opportunity to modernize the
criminal law in order to address the difficulty of proving that a senior

B.A. Chicago, 1997, J.D. Northwestern, 2003. 1would like to thank my wife Anna for
her encouragement and support throughout the writing of this Comment. I also thank
Anna's parents, losif and Margarita, and her grandmother Rose, for welcoming me into the
home in which many of these pages were written. I thank my parents, Howard and Rachel,
for making education a priority and for instilling in me the desire for knowledge. Finally I
owe many thanks to Professor Stephen Presser, who carefully read a draft and made incisive
suggestions, and Professor Paul Robinson, whose fascinating and systematic approach to
criminal law is largely responsible for my own interest in this field.
1 The doctrine originated in two Supreme Court decisions which affirmed convictions of
corporate officers for food and drug violations. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See cases discussed in detail infra
Part II.
2 Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
3 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1343 (1984) (noting that Park and
Dotterweich imposed criminal liability upon officers who did not personally participate in
the activity constituting the violation).
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officer authorized a subordinate's criminal act.4 Classical criminal
law, in seeking to prove that an officer directed or authorized a
criminal act, is frustrated by the ease with which the origin of a
criminal decision is lost in bureaucracy. 5 It clings to an archaic
common law emphasis on overt criminal acts,6 blinding itself to the
corporate prime mover who disguises his transactions among routine
corporate events, acting exclusively through subordinates scattered
throughout an amorphous bureaucracy.'
Sophisticated crimes by
corporate officers are difficult to detect, and in an advanced industrial
economy they threaten society en masse,8 by means of toxic waste,
misbranded drugs, or securities fraud.9 In response to the historic
elusiveness of crimes by corporate officers, the RCO doctrine

4 While the RCO doctrine originated in applying strict liability statutes to corporate
officers, this Comment argues that the doctrine may be applied to corporate crime generally.
See infra Part II.
5 See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 430-31 (1963) (prosecuting senior
corporate officers is difficult because liability depends upon demonstrating their affirmative
participation in the illegal acts of subordinates).
6 See, e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 69
(1933) ("The old cumbrous machinery of the criminal law, designed to try the subjective
blameworthiness of individual offenders, is not adapted for exercising petty regulation on a
wholesale scale ....). See also Craig Haney, CriminalJustice and the Nineteenth-Century
Paradigm: The Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the "Formative Era," 6 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 191, 209 (1982) (discussing the emphasis on free will in the common law,
which viewed each actor as a moral agent choosing between lawful and unlawful conduct,
and which was reinforced by American individualism); Gerhard 0. W. Meuller, Mens Rea
and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1957) ("The common law is a creation by
individuals for individuals. Organized aggregations of private individuals had little
influence in its making.").
7 See, e.g., Denis J. Hauptly & Nancy L. Rider, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code
and White-Collar Crime, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 523, 525 (noting the difficulty of
identifying the responsible participants in complex schemes, who often "tailor" their activity
to escape liability under criminal statutes).
8 Cf Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalizationof American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1135-45 (1995) (noting that prior to the development of a
national economy and the invention of railroads, automobiles, and aircraft, crime was
thought to be an essentially local matter).
9 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952) (noting that the large scale
distribution of goods after the Industrial Revolution has become an instrument of wide
distribution of harm); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J.
2407, 2420-21 (1995).
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imputes, in limited situations, the acts of the corporation to its
officers. "0

The RCO doctrine has been unwisely viewed as a special rule to
be applied exclusively to "public welfare offenses," such as the food
and drug violations implicated in the seminal RCO cases. 1

The

strongest rationale for the doctrine does not lie in the activity sought
to be regulated, but in the elusiveness of the defendant sought to be
prosecuted."2 The vast expansion of the modem economy, combined
with the proliferation of large international corporations, suggests
that the classical public welfare doctrine is outdated as a controlling
concept of an expanded officer liability regime. The Supreme Court
has narrowed the scope of the public welfare doctrine,13 suggesting

that it is an inadequate basis upon which to construct a coherent and
vigorous theory of officer liability. 4 Courts have applied the RCO
doctrine to felony prosecutions under environmental laws, placing
only nominal reliance on .the inherited traditional public welfare
rationale. 5 A reexamination of the RCO doctrine is necessary, in
order to explain recent developments and to guide the application of
the doctrine to new offense contexts.
This Comment argues that the RCO doctrine, although originally
developed in response to misdemeanor prosecutions for public

welfare violations, should be recast as a general theory of criminal
liability of corporate officers. It is a flexible tool which is a powerful
10Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 609, 618 n.27, 633-34,
670 (1984) (discussing the imputation of objective offense elements to officers as a
specialized form of vicarious liability, in which the conduct elements of an offense are
imputed to officials who arguably have "caused" the illegal acts by creating or contributing
to a dangerous situation in which the acts occur); see also United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d
1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting in dicta that willful or negligent culpability may be
imputed to responsible corporate officers under the Clean Water Act).
11See infra Part Ill (criticizing the use of the public welfare doctrine as a rationale for
imputing criminal participation to officers).
12 See infra Parts 1, II (discussing the evidentiary difficulties involved in
prosecuting
corporate officers and arguing that courts should permit the use of RCO doctrine to
overcome them).
13 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604-19 (1994) (declining to impose
strict liability under a statute banning the possession of machine guns, because even a
"public welfare" statute cannot be applied so as to criminalize innocent conduct-in this case
gun ownership).
14 See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability
in
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1110 (1999) (arguing that recent
decisions have severely undermined the public welfare doctrine by weakening the
constitutional basis of strict liability in general).
15 See infra Part Ill.
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antidote to the bureaucratic concealment which shields criminal
actors in a modem corporation. As the successful application of the
doctrine to environmental crimes indicates, the doctrine should be
applied outside of the classical public welfare context to crimes with
mens rea requirements. Part I describes the inherent limitations on
the liability of corporate officers for criminal acts performed by
subordinates. Part II analyzes the origins and development of the
RCO doctrine. Part III critiques the association of the RCO doctrine
with "public welfare" offenses. Part IV describes the application of
the doctrine in the context of environmental crimes and proposes a
new application to per se violations of the Sherman Act. Part V
concludes with some general observations.
I. THE WEAKNESS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE: RESTRICTIONS ON THE
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS FOR ACTS PERFORMED BY OTHER
CORPORATE AGENTS

Whereas a corporation is liable for crimes of its agents acting on
its behalf in the scope of their employment,1 6 a corporate officer is
generally not liable unless he personally participates in 7 or aids and
abets"t a criminal act. 9 When personal participation or express
16

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation is vicariously liable for a

criminal act of an agent where the act is within the scope of the agent's employment and is
done with intent to benefit the corporation. See N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909). Liability may attach even where the corporation
expressly forbade the act and made good faith efforts to prevent it. See Charles R. Nesson,
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1249-50 (1979) [hereinafter Developments in
the Law]. Under the "superior agent" rule, however, corporate liability may be restricted to
acts authorized by the board of directors or senior managers. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 272 (3d ed. 2000). The Model Penal Code restricts corporate liability to
noncriminal "violations," and to criminal offenses only if the relevant statute expressly
applies to corporations. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5), 2.07(l)(a)-(b) (1962). The violation
must have been authorized or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high
managerial agent. Id. § 2.07(l)(c).
"v See generally 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1348 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1990) (citing cases which emphasize

personal participation). It is also necessary that the officer participate in the acts with
criminal intent, except in strict liability offenses lacking mens rea requirements. See
generally Sayre, supra note 6 (discussing the range of public welfare offenses imposing
strict liability).
18 Aiding and abetting liability requires affirmative participation in the crime or
encouragement of the criminal actor. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949) ("In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant
'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that
he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."') (quoting United
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authorization is shown, it is no defense that the crime was committed

on behalf of the corporation. 20 But an officer cannot be held liable
for acts performed by other corporate agents unless it can be proved
that they acted under the officer's direction or with his permission.2 1

This requirement is rooted in agency principles: the officer as
principal can only be liable for the crimes of a subordinate who was
acting as his agent.22 Thus, the law draws a clear distinction between

affirmative authorization of subordinates' acts, which is sufficient for
liability,2 3 and passive acquiescence or even knowledge of such acts,
which is insufficient standing alone.

4

States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)). Courts generally require a showing of a
wrongful act in order to justify liability. See, e.g., United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434,
444 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring an "act on the part of the defendant which contributes to the
execution of a crime") (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir.
1981)); United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
defendant aided and abetted his subordinate's illegal storage of hazardous waste by directing
that the waste be stored in a concealed location); United States v. Belt, 574 F.2d 1234, 1240
(5th Cir. 1978) (noting that aiding and abetting liability requires proof of an overt act).
19Similarly, the "corporate veil" protects an officer from debts arising out of the
corporation's wrongful acts, but does not insulate him from liability for personal misconduct.
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 955-56 (7th Cir.
1999). A thorough analysis of officer liability in tort is beyond the scope of this Comment,
which will analyze criminal liability exclusively.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (holding a corporate officer
criminally liable for knowingly participating in an illegal conspiracy under the Sherman Act,
irrespective of whether he acted in a "representative capacity"); United States v. Amrep
Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Where... the prosecution introduces evidence of
active and knowing participation by corporate officers, they are equally liable with the
corporation."). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(6)(a).
21 See generally FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 1349 (citing cases in which emphasize
direction or authorization). Cf United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(noting that while the general rule requires that officers must personally authorize a criminal
act, personal involvement need not be shown where the corporation itself is an illegal
business).
22 See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibilityfor the Acts of Another,
43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702-08 (1930) (concluding that courts hold a principal criminally
liable for acts which he "causes" his agent to perform, either by express encouragement or
knowing acquiescence).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Berger, 456 F.2d 1349, 1352 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming
aiding and abetting liability of president and chief executive officer whose "willful
affirmative acts" included directing a bookkeeper to remove invoices of a foreign subsidiary
as part of a tax-evasion scheme).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 190-93 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
aiding and abetting liability of corporate officer who knew that others were making false
statements to a government agency, because the officer did not affirmatively encourage the
making of those statements); KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS §
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It is extraordinarily difficult, however, to prove that a corporate
officer authorized the criminal act of a subordinate, because such
authorization is rarely documented.25 A powerful executive with vast
control over corporate operations can easily create the impression
that he did not know the details of illegal activity. 6 To some extent
the law encourages this concealment, because many statutes
explicitly require proof of an affirmative illegal act before imposing
liability upon an officer.2 7
In some cases, juries are permitted to infer knowing
authorization from circumstantial evidence, yet these cases typically
involve small, closely-held corporations where the inference is
compelling.28 In a closely-held corporation, an officer often closely
5:09, at 164 (2d ed. 1984) ("Mere presence at the scene of the crime, association with the
perpetrator, and knowledge of illegal activity ... are insufficient standing alone, as is mere
approval or acquiescence unaccompanied by expressed concurrence or other contribution to
the crime."). See also Tony McAdams & C. Burk Tower, Personal Accountability in the
Corporate Sector, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 67, 68 (1978) (distinguishing between aiding and
abetting liability and liability for wrongful acts of subordinates).
25 See, e.g., Ronald R. Sims & Margaret P. Spencer, Understanding Corporate
Misconduct: An Overview and Discussion, in CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: THE LEGAL,
SOCIETAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1, 11-12 (Ronald R. Sims & Margaret P. Spencer eds.,
1995) (noting that senior officers can easily disguise misconduct in a large organization, as
in one case in which officers instituted compliance policies in order to conceal their approval
of misconduct).
26 See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting
that an officer who exercises complete control over corporate operations may avoid
confronting the details of illegal toxic waste disposal, making it difficult to impose liability);
Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of
Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 883
(1991) (noting that in environmental prosecutions knowledge is easier to assign to a lowlevel employee who handles hazardous waste than to a senior executive).
27 See, e.g., People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066, 1068-69 (N.Y. 1991) (construing NY
Penal Law to limit individual liability for corporate criminal acts to defendants who caused
to be performed or personally performed illegal conduct).
28 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shafer, 202 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. 1964) (stating that
president and principal officer may be held criminally liable for failure to collect sales taxes
if he "personally dominated and controlled all the affairs of the corporation"); Carr v. State,
16 So. 150, 154 (Ala. 1893) (holding bank president criminally responsible for the
acceptance of a deposit by the bank's sole employee after it became insolvent, where the
defendant's control over the employee was so complete that he effectively accepted the
deposit personally); State v. Gilbert, 251 N.W. 478, 487 (Wis. 1933) (permitting the
inference that directors knowingly authorized fraudulent conversion, where defendants
authorized checks drawing on the converted funds, were informed of unauthorized bond
sales, and discussed repaying the converted funds); State v. Comer, 28 P.2d 1027, 1032
(Wash. 1934) (affirming conviction of president for improperly diverting trust funds, where
the defendant was the corporation's majority stockholder and determined its policies and
procedures).
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supervises and has intimate knowledge of all business operations,
justifying the inference that the criminal act was performed under that
officer's direction or with his express or implied consent. 29 For
example, in United States v. Andreadis,3 ° an officer who dominated a
closely-held corporation3" was charged with mail and wire fraud
arising out of a scheme to market fraudulent weight loss pills. 2 The
advertisements for the pills contained extravagant and scientifically

false claims,33 which the defendant officer knew were false because
of repeated protestations by officials in industry and government.34
Nevertheless, the prosecution lacked direct evidence that the officer
had instructed the advertising agency to make what he knew to be
false claims. 35 The court, however, permitted the inference of such

knowing authorization from circumstantial evidence, because the
officer reviewed and approved the advertising strategy 36 and had even
interviewed the "endorsers" who claimed to have lost weight using
the pills. 37 Thus, the deciding factor was the officer's controlling and

intimate supervision of the illegal marketing plan, regardless of the
29

Compare Commonwealth

v. Stone, 144 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. 1958) (affirming

conviction of president of a collection agency for fraudulent conversion of client funds,
where the defendant controlled all bank accounts and was the only one authorized to sign
checks) with Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Va. 1976) (reversing
conviction of company president where the state lacked evidence that the defendant
personally controlled all employees and finances, and thus could not prove that he authorized
all fraudulent requests for reimbursement).
30 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d
1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a jury may infer from circumstantial evidence that
defendants willfully discharged pollutants into a creek, so that direct evidence of "someone
turning on a valve or diverting wastes" is not required).
31 See Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 427 n.3 (stating that because the defendant officer
effectively "was" the corporation, both could be referred to by using the officer's name).
32 Id. at 426.
31 Id. at 427.
34 Id. at 428-29 (noting that the National Better Business Bureau had informed the
defendant of scientific objections to the pills, and that the Kansas State Board of Health
refused to allow the pills to be advertised in Kansas). The court noted in dicta that even if
the officer was unaware of the falsity of the advertising, he had an affirmative duty to insure
that its claims were true. See id. at 430 (citing United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527, 532 (2d
Cir. 1962); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940)).
35 See Andreadis, 366 F.2d at 430 ("The Government did not prove that [the defendant
officer] specifically directed [the agency] to advertise the factually false claims, knowing
them to be false, but as he reviewed and approved the 'live' endorser campaign this does not
insulate him from liability for their propagation.") (citing Harris v. United States, 261 F.2d
792, 796 (9th Cir. 1958)).
36 id.
37 Id. at 429-30.
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fact that the advertisements were physically produced by an
independent advertising agency.38 Because of the pervasive control
which the officer exercised over the advertising campaign, the court
appropriately referred to the advertising firm as the officer's agent.3 9
Without proof of an agency relationship, however, an officer cannot
be held liable for mere "knowledge plus acquiescence;" there must be
evidence of affirmative authorization. °
Although a trier of fact is permitted to infer that an officer
knowingly authorized a criminal act when he exercises complete
control over the direct criminal actors, such pervasive control is
exceedingly difficult to prove, as illustrated by Bourgeois v.
Commonwealth.41
Bourgeois was the president of Revco, a
corporation which trained people to operate trucks. 4' He was held
liable in the trial court for defrauding a state program which
reimbursed companies for providing job training to disabled
persons. 43 The prosecution presented evidence that twenty-four
disabled students had paid Revco for some of the cost of their
training, yet Revco fraudulently sought reimbursement for the full
cost of the training from the state.' One student gave $200 in cash
directly to Bourgeois as partial payment for the course, which
Bourgeois then recorded on a signed receipt, yet Revco proceeded to
bill the state for $795, the full cost of the training. 4 The Virginia
Supreme Court reversed Bourgeois' conviction, however, because the
prosecution failed to prove that he had personally authorized each
fraudulent reimbursement presented into evidence.46 The court noted
that the State had not proved that Bourgeois controlled all of Revco's
employees or its funds, noting that a vice-president also had authority
" See id. at 430.
39 See id. at n,10 (noting that the Kastor-Hilton advertising firm was acting as Andreadis'
agent).
40 See Sayre, supra note 22, at 702 (noting that a principal is only liable for acts of his
agent which he is causally responsible for). Current doctrine thus has a restricted view of
when a subordinate is the agent of a superior officer for the purposes of officer liability and
an expansive view of employees as the corporation's agents for the purposes of corporate
liability. As explained above, any employee acting in the scope of his employment with
intent to benefit the corporation is the "agent" of the corporation for the purposes of
corporate liability.
41 227 S.E.2d 714 (Va. 1976).
42 Id. at 715.
43 Bourgeois was convicted of grand larceny. See id.
44 Id. at 718.
41 Id. at 717.
46 Id. at 718.
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to sign checks on behalf of Revco.47 This case illustrates the
difficulty of holding an officer liable for subordinates' acts, because

only in rare cases is an officer's control so pervasive that it compels
the inference that he authorized the criminal acts.4 8
Bourgeois demonstrates that mere knowledge of a criminal

violation is insufficient to incriminate an officer, because the officer
might lack complete power over the criminal activity and thus may
not have been responsible for authorizing it. 9 This requirement

applies even in strict liability offenses; although it is unnecessary to
prove that the officer knew the facts constituting the violation, the
prosecution still needs to show that the officer either personally
committed the illegal act or completely controlled the subordinates
who did."
On the other hand, in an offense with a mens rea

requirement, power alone without culpable knowledge is insufficient,
because it would allow a guilty subordinate to automatically
implicate his superior.51

Thus, in the vast majority of cases the

" Id. at 718-19.
48 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stone, 144 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1958) (affirming conviction of
president of a collection agency for fraudulent conversion of client funds, where the
defendant controlled all bank accounts and was the only one authorized to sign checks).
49 See also People v. Int'l Steel Corp., 226 P.2d 587, 592-93 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct.
1951) (reversing conviction of corporate secretary for illegal pollution caused by burning
automobile bodies, where the defendant knew of the illegal activity but as a mere
"ministerial officer" he lacked "authority to transact the business of the corporation upon his
independent volition and judgment").
50 See, e.g., People v. Lieber, 304 P.2d 869, 872 (Cal. 1956) (holding that if
strict liability
is to be imposed for receipt or possession of narcotics, a pharmacy president cannot be held
liable unless "he and he alone" had access to the narcotics) (emphasis added); State v.
Lindberg, 215 P. 41,47 (Wash. 1923) (holding bank officer strictly liable after he personally
borrowed funds from his bank in excess of statutory limits, despite his lack of knowledge
that the funds came from the bank). A settled exception to this rule is in cases in which the
corporation operates an illegal business, where all officers are presumed to have committed
illegal acts. See Carolene Prod. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1944), aff'd
on other grounds, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) (holding that where a corporation is engaged in an
unlawful business, such as selling adulterated milk products, officers may be held criminally
liable for the acts of subordinates done in the normal course of business, regardless of
whether they personally supervised the acts) (emphasis added). Cf United States v. Laffal,
83 A.2d 871 (D.C. App. 1976) (permitting the inference that the president of a corporation
which operated a restaurant frequented by prostitutes and drunkards failed to prevent the
business from keeping disorderly house); Tenement House Dept. v. McDevitt, 109 N.E. 88,
89-90 (N.Y. 1915) (holding that a building owner generally knows whether his premises are
being used for prostitution, justifying strict liability even though in some cases the illegality
occurs without the owner's knowledge).
51See, e.g., People v. Brainard, 183 N.Y.S. 452, 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (holding that
the criminal prosecution of a publishing company president for publishing an obscene book,
done without the president's knowledge or acquiescence, "cannot be sustained, unless we are
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officer must have both complete power over the activity giving rise to
the crime and sufficient knowledge of the activity so that the criminal
act can be shown to have been impliedly authorized.52
While an officer's authorization of a criminal act is easier to
infer in a closely-held corporation, where an officer is often involved
in all decisions, such an inference is almost impossible in the context
of a larger corporation, where multiple managers may have authority

over an activity. The vast evidentiary differences between small and
large corporations create a quasi-immunity for officers in large
corporations who avoid direct connections to illegal activity.53 RCO
liability, by contrast, is far less constrained by the size of the
corporation and the relative closeness of the officer's supervisory

role.54 The RCO doctrine permits a court, without evidence of an
officer's pervasive control, to impute the criminal act of a subordinate
to the officer. 5 The doctrine concedes that evidence that the officer
authorized a criminal act may be unavailable or insufficient, 6
foreclosing liability under traditional theories. 7 However, if the
RCO doctrine is applied, once a jury determines that an officer
satisfies the conditions of a "responsible relationship" as a matter of
prepared to hold that the manager of a corporation is criminally liable for every criminalact
committed by any subordinate officer of the corporation in connection with his duties in
behalf of the corporation. I do not understand that any authority has asserted any such broad
")(emphasis added).
proposition ....
52 See, e.g., State v. Seufert, 271 S.E.2d 756, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) ("Where the
crime charged involves guilty knowledge or criminal intent, as does embezzlement, it is
essential to criminal liability on the part of the officer or agent that he actually and
personally did the acts which constitute the offense or that they be done by his direction or
permission.").
53 See Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1254 (noting that senior officers in
large corporations can prevent subordinates from providing them with information about
illegal activity, allowing them to escape liability).
14 See infra Part
II.
55 Id.
56 See

United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-71 (1975) (conceding that evidence of
the officer's knowledge or personal participation in the criminal violation is not necessary
for liability under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); see generally PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 279-80 (1997) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW] (noting that doctrines
of imputation are used in situations in which offense elements cannot be satisfied, such as
complicity cases in which the conduct of the principal is imputed to a defendant who has not
participated in the conduct constituting the crime).
" See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. 933 F.2d 35, 50-55 (1st Cir.
1991) (vacating conviction of corporate officer for knowingly transporting hazardous waste,
because the jury was not permitted to presume that the defendant knew of the illegal
shipments from the fact that he participated actively in day-to-day management and had been
previously warned that his company was illegally disposing of contaminated soil).
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fact,5" criminal participation will be imputed to the officer as a matter
of law.5 9
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RCO DOCTRINE
A. THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINE: PUBLIC WELFARE STATUTES, STRICT
LIABILITY CRIMES

The RCO doctrine originated in United States v. Dotterweich,60
where the Supreme Court considered whether a corporate officer was

a "person" under the enforcement provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 61 a strict liability statute.62
Dotterweich was the president of the Buffalo Pharmacal Company
("BPC"), which repackaged and resold drugs it purchased from
wholesalers.63
Both Dotterweich and BPC were charged with

introducing

adulterated

or

commerce, in violation of the

misbranded
FDCA. 64

drugs

into

interstate

The Second Circuit reversed

Dotterweich's conviction on the ground that Congress meant to limit
criminal liability to the corporation, so that an officer could not be
considered a "person" for the purposes of criminal prosecution under
the FDCA.65 Clearly, imposing strict liability is a departure from the

usual requirements of criminal law, because in a strict liability
58 See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Under
Dotterweich, whether defendant had sufficient 'responsibility' over the discharges to be
criminally liable would be a question for the jury.").
59 This distinction between an inference from the facts and an imputation stemming from
doctrine is emphasized in the First Circuit's analysis in MacDonald& Watson. See 933 F.2d
at 50-55 n.20 (noting that while a jury could permissibly infer an officer's knowledge of
hazardous waste shipments from his knowledge of other shipments of the same type, it could
not impute such knowledge to the officer as a matter of law). See also Lewis v. Welch, 126
A.D.2d 519, 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("[T]he employees' criminal culpability which may
be imputed to the corporation by the statute cannot be further imputed to its individual
directors, whose culpability requires their 'knowledge or privity' in the prohibited act.").
60 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (5-4 decision).
"' 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)(2002) (stating that a "person" who violates the FDCA is subject
to a fine and imprisonment).
62 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 (noting that the FDCA imposes a penalty without
any
"consciousness of wrongdoing"); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978) (listing Dotterweich as one of several cases in which the Court has
recognized a strict liability offense).
63 United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co. Inc., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942).
64 Id.

Id. at 503. The court noted, however, that "[i]f an individual operated a corporation as
his 'alter ego' or agent he might be the principal," meaning that in cases of direct personal
involvement the officer could be considered a "person" under the Act. See id.
65
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offense no showing of mens rea is necessary,6 6 which usually means

that the defendant need not be aware of the facts constituting the
violation.67 Dotterweich's conviction, premised on a strict liability
theory, was thus affirmed by the Supreme Court in spite of the fact
that he did not know that the drugs were mislabeled.68 In fact, there
was no evidence that Dotterweich even participated in the illegal
shipment.6 9 The Court explained this harsh result by stating that the

"circumstances of modem industrialism" endanger the health of
defenseless consumers, justifying criminal prosecution of "otherwise
innocent" corporate officers in "responsible" positions."0 The RCO
doctrine was thus linked with a public welfare rationale, under which
public health
and "danger" create an exception to normal rules of
71
liability.

The application of strict liability to corporate officers was
reaffirmed in United States v. Park,72 where the president of a retail
food chain was held liable for FDCA violations stemming from
rodent infestation in company warehouses.73
Park not only
reaffirmed the imposition of strict liability in principle,74 but applied
it to a large corporation in which the defendant officer was far
66See generally LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 257-62 (discussing criminal liability for
conduct without fault).
67See Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 108
(explaining that mens rea typically refers to mere awareness that the facts constitute a
violation, as opposed to knowledge that those facts constitute illegal conduct).
68See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81 ("The prosecution to which Dotterweich was
subjected is based on a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective
means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing."). See also George P. Fletcher, The
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 403 n.8
(1971) (noting that in Dotterweich, culpability was presumed with respect to the misbranded
status of the drug shipment).
69See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 ("There is no proof or claim that [Dotterweich] ever
knew of the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in question, much less that
he actively participated in their introduction.") (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
71Id. (noting that the FDCA was intended to keep impure and adulterated food and
drugs, as well as "illicit and noxious articles," out of the market).
72 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (6-3 decision).
71 Id. at 660-61.

74 Id. at 670-71 (noting that liability may be imposed under the FDCA despite a failure to
prove the officer's personal participation or knowledge of the illegal acts). Although Park
was directly notified of the rodent infestation by the government, he argued that he had
directed subordinates to correct the problem, which suggests he did not in fact know that the
violations persisted. Id. at 662-64; see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 n.II
(1993) (noting that Park held a corporate officer strictly liable under the FDCA).
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removed from the management of the warehouses where the
violations occurred.7 5 Whereas Dotterweich led a small company in
which he was intimately involved in operations,7 6 Park was the
president of a corporation with about 36,000 employees and 874
retail outlets, and he exercised control through subordinates. 7 Park
argued that he had delegated responsibility for correcting the FDCA
violations to a vice-president and was informed that the problem was
being addressed.78 Despite Park's efforts, subsequent inspections
found that rodent infestation persisted in the warehouses.79 The
Court, in imposing liability, noted that Park was at least aware that
his subordinates were unreliable, in light of their prior failures to
correct unsanitary conditions."0 The Court interpreted the FDCA to
impose a duty not only to remedy violations but to implement
business practices that prevented them from occurring. 8 In affirming
Park's conviction, the Court stated the three black letter elements of
RCO liability: an officer is criminally liable if (1) "by reason of his
position in the corporation," he had (2) "responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of," and (3) "failed to do so.""2 Park reaffirmed
the "public welfare" rationale for RCO liability by emphasizing the
need to protect the food supply83 and by imposing a heightened duty
upon officers who assume positions affecting public health.84

75The Fourth Circuit in fact reversed Park's conviction on the ground that the
prosecution had failed to allege an act or omission. See United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839,
841 (4th Cir. 1974) ("It is the defendant's relation to the criminal acts, not merely his
relation to the corporation, which the jury must consider.") (emphasis added).
United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co. Inc., 131 F.2d at 501 (noting that Dotterweich
exercised general control over all operations and directed employees to fill orders received
from physicians).
77Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
78 Id. at 663-64.
79Id. at 661-62.
80 Id. at 677-78.
8 Id. at 672.
82 Id. at 673-74. The critical second prong is generally referred to as the "responsible
76

relationship" or "responsible share" test.
83Id. at 671 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)).
84 Id. at 672.
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B. RESPONSIBLE RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS: AN APPROPRIATE
INNOVATION

The innovation of Dotterweich and Park was not the imposition
of strict liability per se, which has always been controversial,85 but
the imposition of strict liability on officers who had not directly
participatedin the violations.86 Because a strict liability offense has
no mens rea requirement,87 it was not necessary to show that
Dotterweich knew that the drugs were misbranded, or that Park knew
that the warehouses remained unsanitary.88 Even in a strict liability
offense, however, there must be a showing of a voluntary act or an
85 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 422-25 (1958) (arguing that strict criminal liability punishes the blameless, and
that the "open and official admission that crime can be respectable and criminality a matter
of ill-chance" causes "shocking damage ... to social morale"); Packer, supra note 67, at 109
(discussing the "consensus" view that criminal liability should not be imposed without a
mens rea requirement).
86 The main policy criticism (as opposed to moral objection) is that if strict liability is to
be imposed it should be limited to defendants who are in a position to take greater care to
prevent violations. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L. REV. 632, 695 (1954) [hereinafter Developments in the LawFDCA] (conceding that strict liability under the FDCA may motivate corporations to select
and supervise employees with greater care, yet criticizing the potential prosecution of
companies already operating under strict standards because "as a practical matter, [they]
cannot be expected to take greater precautions"). See also William McVisk, Toward a
Rational Theory of Criminal Liability for the Corporate Executive, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 75, 88 (1978) (noting that by failing to provide a defense to officers who have
taken care to prevent violations, the Court has failed to provide an incentive to exercise
care).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (holding that liability for
unlawful possession of hand grenades does not require a showing of mens rea).
88 Because of the harshness of this strict liability standard, decisions to bring criminal
charges under the FDCA generally take into account factors such as "the prospective
defendant's awareness of the violation, his past record, and the seriousness of the offense."
See Developments in the Law-FDCA, supra note 86, at 696. The Supreme Court has
suggested, however, than even in a strict liability offense the defendant must have
knowledge offacts sufficient to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. See, e.g., Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (holding that a strict liability statute criminalizing the
possession of an unregistered machine gun requires knowledge that the firearm can be used
as an automatic weapon, so as to avoid criminalizing the innocent activity of gun
ownership). But these decisions expressly exclude "limited circumstances" such as the
situation in Dotterweich, where knowledge of the facts constituting the violation was not
required because the defendant, as a responsible officer, was aware of the probability of
strict regulation. See id. at 607 (noting that while in a strict liability offense the defendant
must be aware that he is dealing with a dangerous item, such awareness is presumed where
defendants routinely handle such items, so that the burden is on these defendants to
determine whether their conduct constitutes a violation) (citing United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 254 (1922)).
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omission to perform a duty of which the actor is capable.89 The
relevant question is whether the actor participated in the prohibited
conduct or caused the illegal result. 90 Thus, in Dotterweich and Park,
the prosecutors alleged that the defendants' acts or failures to act had
caused the prohibited result-adulterated food or mislabeled drugs.9 1

In theory, such participation indicates that the actor was at least
negligent, although proof of negligence is of course not required in a

strict liability offense.92
When strict liability is sought to be imposed upon a corporate
officer, however, the "acts" constituting the violation are typically
not performed by the defendant, as demonstrated by Park's lack of
personal

involvement

in

the

operation

of the

warehouses.93

Consequently, the RCO doctrine is best understood as an imputation
of the acts constituting the violation to the officer.9 4 It is a form of
vicarious liability in which senior officers may be held criminally
responsible for the acts of low-level employees.95 By imputing the
89

See CRIMINAL

LAW,

supra note 56, at 141 (discussing the actus reus offense

requirement).
90 See LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 265.
"' See Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660 (1975) (quoting the indictment which charged defendants
with causing food to be held in a building accessible to rodents and to be contaminated by
them). See also Robinson, supra note 10, at 668 (discussing a "causal" rationale for the
liability imposed in Park, according to which liability is justified because defendants
"caused" a dangerous situation); Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1262 ("The
Supreme Court has declared that no inquiry into the intent of the actor is required to establish
liability under [the FDCA and a few other federal statutes], only a finding that the
defendant's conduct or neglect constitutes a proximate cause of the violation.") (citing Park,
421 U.S. at 672-74; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85).
92 Strict liability, even in a vicarious sense, is generally limited to situations in which the
defendant is presumptively negligent. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 61718 (1993) (noting that the forfeiture of property arising out of a drug possession conviction,
imposed on a strict, vicarious liability theory, is premised on the owner's negligence). See
also Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731,
744 (1960) (noting that "strict liability statutes require an antecedent judgment of per se
unreasonableness"); CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, at 287-88 (discussing strict liability as a
form of "codified imputation," where a culpable mental state need not be shown because it is
imputed to the actor in situations where negligence is presumed).
9' Cf State v. Lindberg, 215 Pac. 41 (1923) (holding bank officer strictly liable after he
personally borrowed funds from his bank in excess of statutory limits).
94 See supra note 9; Packer, supra note 67, at 116-19 (explaining that in Dotterweich,
strict liability merely relieved the prosecution of the burden of showing culpability, such as
negligence-whereas the imposition of vicarious liability implicated the entirely different
question whether Dotterweich could be liable absent any personalparticipationin the illegal
shipment).
95 See, e.g., State v. Beaudry, 365 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. 1985) (holding corporate agent
vicariously liable where a subordinate kept a tavern open past the legal closing time).
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acts of subordinates to officers, vicarious liability also eliminates the
rigid requirement that an actor proximately "cause" the harm through
his acts.96

The reliance on vicarious liability in Dotterweich and Park has
elicited severe criticism from commentators.9 7
With some
exceptions," most commentators have assumed that the Supreme
Court did not mean to impose a pure form of vicarious liability, but
meant to impose liability only upon officers whose conduct was at
least negligent.9 9 On the latter view, although a responsible corporate
officer might possess formal power to prevent the illegal conduct of a
subordinate, the officer would not be liable without proof of
negligence. 10
96 Park did not hold that the officer's acts had caused the violation, but that the officer's
"responsible relationship" sufficed as a proxy for proof of proximate cause. See Park, 421
U.S. at 674 ("The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corporate
agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal link.") (emphasis added);
McAdams & Tower, supra note 24, at 70-71 (noting that the Court did not require the
prosecution to "pinpoint" a specific act or omission by Park that had caused the violation).
Moreover, whenever an actor is sought to be held liable for the criminal act of another,
"causation" is always problematic because of the presence of an intervening will. Cf
Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof Doctrine,
73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 327 (1985) (arguing that an agent's voluntary act cannot be "caused"
in a physical sense by a principal, because in the final analysis the agent freely chose to act).
See also Robinson, supra note 10, at 634 n.89 (noting that a "causal" theory is less
applicable to Park than other vicarious liability cases).
97 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 268 (noting that Dotterweich is
an "outrageous"
example of a court assuming that strict liability offense also justifies vicarious liability).
98Brickey, supra note 3, at 1356-57 (While Dotterweich's facts suggest the presence of
negligence, the case involved a classic public welfare offense and is properly interpreted to
impose strict liability.); Steven Zipperman, The Park Doctrine - Application of Strict
Criminal Liability to Corporate Individuals for Violation of Environmental Crimes, 10
UCLA J. ENVNTL. L. & POL'Y 123, 129 (1991); CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 57, at 356-58
(While Park held that the Constitution does not bar vicarious liability of corporate officers,
courts have limited its application to strict liability offenses).
99 See, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 287 ("The fact that a corporate officer is both a
'person' and an 'individual' is not indicative of an intent to place vicarious liability on the
officer.") (Murphy, J., dissenting); Park, 421 U.S. at 683 (Officer liability under Dotterweich
requires a finding of "wrongful conduct amounting at least to common-law negligence.")
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV.
828, 848-49 (1999) (concluding that Dotterweich's conviction required a "mens rea of
'imperfect care"'); Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict
Liability Offenses - A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 469-70
(1981) (interpreting Park to impose a negligence standard which, while not equivalent to a
common law "ordinary care" standard, is nevertheless a "slight" negligence standard
requiring extraordinarycare).
100See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1262 n. 102 (Park and
Dotterweich do not authorize a pure form of vicarious liability, because the officers must be
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Inserting a "negligence" requirement into the doctrine, however,
simply begs the question of how to define negligence in the context

of an officer's relationship to his subordinates. The Supreme Court
likely avoided a precise definition of the scope of vicarious liability,
because it is impossible to identify ex ante the officers having "a

responsible share" in the violation."'

Even if criminal acts of

employees may be imputed to officers, there must be some flexibility
in determining which officers are to be liable. Park expressly
rejected the notion that any corporate officer, no matter how far

removed from a violation, is vicariously liable as a supervising
official." °2 When liability is predicated upon events of which an
officer could not possibly have known about, there is a risk of

criminalizing a "complete absence of relevant conduct.""0 3
By contrast, the RCO doctrine functions to isolate meaningful
contact with a violation, precisely because the sheer size of a

corporation and the far-flung duties of an officer tend to minimize the
significance of such contact. In Park, despite the massive size of the

corporation, the defendant was notified of violations by a letter from
a government agency and had previously handled complaints about
sanitation." 4 In Dotterweich, despite the defendant's lack of personal
involvement in the illegal shipment, he directly supervised the

business process that resulted in the violation.0 5 A precise definition
of responsible share would impose a rigid formula in an area in which
myriad scenarios are possible.0 6 When corporate officers are aware
shown to have failed to exercise care and as such their guilt is not automatic upon proof of
their subordinates' guilt.).
101 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284.
102 See Park, 421 U.S. at 674 (approving of a jury instruction which did not permit
liability to attach solely on the basis of an officer's corporate position and instead required a
finding of a responsible relationship to the violation). See also Rooney v. Commonwealth,
500 S.E.2d 830, 833-34 (Va. App. 1998) (overturning conviction of corporate president for
failing to make required deposits into a trust account, where the state failed to present
evidence describing the officer's powers or duties with respect to the required deposits,
thereby precluding a finding of a responsible relationship).
103 See Graham Hughes, CriminalOmissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 602 (1958) (arguing that
liability should only be imposed where an actor ought to have known either the relevant
regulation or facts triggering regulatory requirements; otherwise the law is not addressing
relevant conduct).
104 Park,421 U.S. at 661-62.
1o5 United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co. Inc., 131 F.2d at 501 (noting that Dotterweich
exercised general control over all operations and directed employees to fill orders received
from physicians).
106 Cf Matis v. United States, 236 B.R. 562, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that in
imposing personal liability upon "responsible persons" for failure to remit withholding taxes
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of a precise legal limitation on liability, it is easy for them to tailor
their conduct in order to escape liability." 7 Finally, mere lack of
precision is not a bar to constitutional criminal regulation. 0 8
The responsible share concept retains the flexibility to adapt to
varied corporate contexts and isolates officers who have a rational,
relevant connection to the violation.0 9 On the one hand, the concept
is broad enough to encompass officers who possess a mere formal
authority over the activity in question, without proof that they had
actual knowledge of criminal violations."0
Unlike traditional
theories of liability, there is no requirement that the defendant
commit an affirmative wrongful act."' In fact, Park has been
interpreted to require mere formal authority over the business process
in which the violation occurred, as opposed to a demonstration that
the officer exercised the authority in practice."' On the other hand,
corporate procedures or bylaws themselves do not prove that an
officer possessed actual authority, and thus are not sufficient to
generate a finding of responsibility." 3
to the Internal Revenue Service, courts do not simply consider the defendant's technical
authority or official title but whether he has a close enough connection to the tax default so
as to have been able to prevent it) (citing Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930, 939 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
107 See Hauptly & Rider, supra note 7 (noting the capacity of officers to manipulate legal
rules in order to escape liability).
'08 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding that regulations
prohibiting obscenity do not violate due process merely because of a lack of precision); John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, And The Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 231 (1985) (arguing that the fairness of a criminal statute does not depend on the
precision of its drafting, but on whether a law-abiding person in the actor's situation would
have reason to avoid the proscribed conduct.). But see Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286-87
(suggesting that the FDCA does not provide adequate notice to those subject to prosecution)
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
109 See Robinson, supra note 10, at 670-71 (arguing that the "responsible relation"
concept in Dotterweich and Park is "designed to establish causal responsibility through risk
creation, or at least to increase the likelihood that an actor held liable is infact culpable even
though proof of his culpability is not formally required") (emphasis added).
110See Brickey, supra note 3, at 1363-64 (contrasting Park's concept of a "responsible
relationship," in which an officer merely possesses a "factual" connection to the violation
such that he has the power and responsibility to prevent it, with a traditionally culpable
mental state).
...I1d.
at 1366 (noting that Park rejected the appellate court's holding that the
prosecution must allege a specific wrongful act on the part of officer).
112 See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998) (construing Park to
require a showing of authority with respect to conditions underlying the violation, rather than
an exercise of authority with respect to the activity) (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74).
113United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Absent formal supervisory authority over the activity leading to

the violation, an officer might still enter into a "responsible
relationship," demonstrating the flexibility of the concept. An
example of this phenomenon, as Park suggests, is if the officer is
notified of violations by a government agency. 14 One court has
simply required that there be a "nexus" between the officer's position
and the violations such that the officer could have influenced the acts

constituting the violations, and that the officer's actions or inactions
"facilitated" the violations." 5 Such a nexus, it seems clear, may be
found even where the officer had no physical contact with the site of
the violations.16
In order to develop the concept of responsible relationship,

courts should consider a combination of factors, such as the officer's
authority in the corporation, his actual control over the relevant
activity and the relevant subordinates, and the degree of notice which
the officer had of the violation. The Supreme Court has accepted that
the concept of responsible relationship defies precise definition,
because the circumstances of each particular case are so different. 7
An officer should never be convicted purely on the basis of his

position in the corporation, as some courts assume. 118 Courts should
develop the law of responsible relationship without wedding it to a
14 See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined Quantities of
Articles of Drug, 145 F. Supp.
2d 692, 705 (S.D. Md. 2001) (concluding that defendant president had a responsible
relationship to transactions violating FDCA because he had strategic management authority
such that he was familiar with all company operations, and because the Food and Drug
Administration Warning Letter was addressed to him).
115 In Re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn.
App. 1992).
..
6 United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that neither
physical presence nor personal participation is required in order to impose criminal liability
upon officers under the FDCA); accord Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. United States, 209
F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1953).
117 The Court has declined to define "responsible relation." See Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at
285 ("It would be too treacherous to define or even to indicate by way of illustration the
class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation. To attempt a formula
embracing the variety of conduct whereby persons may responsibly contribute in furthering a
transaction forbidden by an Act of Congress, to wit, to send illicit goods across state lines,
would be mischievous futility. In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise
guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment ofjuries must be trusted.").
118See, e.g., United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 836 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Park had
personally done nothing directly related to the charged offenses, but instead had been
indicted solely for his role as CEO of the company."); United States v. New England
Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 234 (D. Mass. 1980) ("The line drawn by the Court
[in Park] between a conviction based on corporate position alone and one based on a
'responsible relationship' to the violation is a fine one, and arguably no wider than a
corporate bylaw.").

AMIAD KUSHNER

[Vol. 93

rigid formula."1 9 The overriding objective should be to develop a set
of factors suggesting criminal participation in the absence of direct
evidence tying the defendant to a criminal decision."'
There should be some clear limits to responsible relationship
liability, however. Where the underlying offense is one of strict
liability, courts should bear in mind that in Dotterweich and Park
some negligence was most likely involved, though such a showing
Park emphasized that an officer in a
was not formally required.'
responsible relationship is presumptively blameworthy, strongly
suggesting that a responsible officer cannot be so far removed from
the crime that a presumption of blame would make no sense.122 In
fact, Park recognized an "impossibility defense," which permits an
officer in a responsible relationship to escape liability upon a
showing that preventing the violation was objectively impossible. 3
The impossibility defense has never been successfully raised, but it
highlights the fact that a showing of a "responsible relationship" is
merely a prima facie case, and so courts should not assume that it is
equivalent to liability.'24
III. ABANDONING THE PUBLIC WELFARE RATIONALE

Recently, courts have begun to apply the RCO doctrine to
statutes with mens rea requirements, an apparent extension of the
doctrine developed in Dotterweich and Park, which involved strict

19 See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the Supreme Court has "refused to define the boundaries of the [RCO] doctrine ... leaving
the question for district courts and juries"); United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp.
485, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that Park and Dotterweich stand for a "strict liabilitynegligence hybrid standard" in cases involving criminal liability of corporate officers)
(emphasis added).
20 See Park, 421 U.S. at 677-78 (noting that irrespective of the Acme corporation's
practice of delegating authority over sanitary conditions to specific subordinates, the
defendant [as a responsible officer] had a duty to remedy violations when those subordinates
failed).
121As Professor Brickey noted, in Dotterweich "not a shred of evidence that some
corporate mechanism equipped to handle routinely so basic a responsibility as the accurate
labeling of its products even existed." Brickey, supra note 3, at 1353. See Park, 421 U.S. at
678 (noting evidence that Park was on notice that he could not rely on subordinates to
prevent or correct the violations, because of a pattern of prior failures by those subordinates).
122 Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (stating that the concept of responsible relationship or
responsible share "imports some measure of blameworthiness").
123 id.
124 Id. at 673-74.
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This innovative expansion of the doctrine has

been inappropriately labeled as an extension of the public welfare
doctrine. 2 6 Courts should abandon this line of justification because

the limited roster of "public welfare" offenses would stifle the
application of the RCO doctrine. 27 More fundamentally, as this
Comment has sought to demonstrate, the RCO doctrine should be
viewed as a general theory of officer liability and not as a narrow
28

exception in public welfare prosecutions. 1

The classical public welfare doctrine was developed in order to

justify a wide range of police regulations, such as traffic offenses or
liquor license laws, which lacked mens rea requirements. 29 The
primary focus of inquiry was whether depriving the defendant of the
protection afforded by a mens rea requirement could be justified,
because it offended classical criminal law. 3 ' The Supreme Court
most famously addressed this problem in United States v. Balint.'3 '
In Balint, the defendants were charged with selling drug derivatives

John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 214 n.84
(1991) (noting that the RCO doctrine has been applied to statutes with knowing, reckless or
negligent mens rea requirements).
126 See, e.g., Cynthia H. Finn, Comment, The Responsible Corporate
Officer, Criminal
Liability, and Mens Rea: Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 543, 545-46
(1996) (arguing that the RCO doctrine should be limited to "true" public welfare offenses);
Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible CorporateOfficer Doctrine-Can You
Go to Jailfor What You Don't Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347, 1349-50 (1992) ("It is now well
established that environmental laws fall within the realm of health and welfare statutes,
whose purpose is to protect the general public.").
127 Courts have been reluctant to expand the roster of public welfare offenses. See, e.g.,
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1985) (holding that unauthorized
possession of food stamps is not a public welfare offense); United States v. Bronx Reptiles,
Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that importing wild animals or birds under
inhumane conditions is not a public welfare offense); United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 139,
1143-44 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that excavating or altering an archeological resource
located on public or Indian lands is not a public welfare offense); United States v. PasillasGaytan, 192 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that illegally procuring naturalization is
not a public welfare offense); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that criminal discharge of pollutants under Clean Water Act is not a public welfare
offense); United States v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that an
alien's illegal presence in the U.S. after being deported or denied admission is not a public
welfare offense).
128 See supra Parts I, II.
129 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
130 See generally Packer, supra note 67 (criticizing the Supreme Court's approval of
125

strict liability).
3' 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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without the required written order form.'32 The defendants claimed
that they did not know that the specific drugs they sold needed to be
recorded on the forms, and that the indictment was defective because
'
it did not allege that they knew the facts constituting the violation. 33
The Court affirmed the conviction, justifying the imposition of strict
liability on the ground that regulatory penalties, whose goal is "social
betterment," should not be treated like true criminal penalties which
punish immoral conduct.' 34
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court in Dotterweich
articulated the RCO doctrine, it relied principally on Balint, the
classic public welfare case.' Whereas Balint addressed the question
whether strict liability was justified per se, the RCO doctrine is best
viewed as a separate inquiry in which the relevant issue is not
justifying strict liability but assigning liability.'36 The classic public
welfare cases involved individual defendants or the owners of
closely-held corporations,' 37 for whom the distribution of liability
was not a serious issue. By contrast, in a large, modem corporation
multiple managers may be connected to the illegal activity, and so the
distribution of liability is a critical issue. Thus, it is not surprising
that Professor Sayre, in his classic analysis of public welfare offenses
in 1933, made no distinction between public welfare prosecutions of
corporate officers as against other defendants, a distinction which is
necessary today.' 3' The primary concern of an officer liability regime
should be the distribution of liability among a class of potential
officer defendants, each member of which might have contributed to

132Id. at

251.

133 Id.

13, Id.at 252.

In affirming Dotterweich's conviction, the Court noted that public welfare legislation
"dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (citing Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53).
136 See Robinson, supra note 10, at 634 (noting that "after Park, courts no longer require
as a prerequisite for liability a close relationship between a corporate officer's activities and
the criminal violation").
137 See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 6, at 61 (concluding that the public welfare doctrine had
"matured" in a case in which the owner of several motor cabs was convicted of a traffic
offense) (citing Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dunning, 2 K.B. 599 (1909)).
3' See, e.g., id. at 80 (applying a common analytical framework to a case involving a
bank officer and cases involving non-corporate officer defendants).
135
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a corporate crime. ' The classical form of the public welfare
doctrine is unsuited to resolve this problem; it must be modified to
suit modem conditions. Although the doctrine provides a broad
theoretical justification for imposing strict liability upon producers
who harm consumers, it provides no basis upon which to distribute
liability among the producer's agents.
Courts continue to cling to a public welfare rationale, however,

producing tortured analyses of whether complex environmental
regulations are true public welfare laws) 4

When a court concludes

that a statute is not a public welfare offense, it obtains a ready excuse
to preclude application of the RCO doctrine.'
This inquiry is
simplistic and artificial, because it has never been clear how to define
a public welfare law, 4 ' let alone what constitutes a threat to the
public welfare.' 43 In fact, the Supreme Court has classified the same
44

1
statute as a public welfare law in one application, but not others.

139

Developments in the Law, supra note 16 (discussing criminal liability of "indirect

actors").
140 See, e.g., United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the Clean Water Act is a public welfare statute); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033,
1038 (9th Cir. 1989) ("There can be little question that [the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act's] purposes, like those of the Food and Drug Act. . . 'touch phases of the lives
and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond
self-protection."') (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280).
141See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51-52
(Ist Cir. 1991) (concluding that the RCO doctrine should be restricted to "public welfare
statutes and regulations" lacking mens rea requirements). See also Coffee, supra note 125,
at 214 (disapproving of the expansion of the RCO doctrine beyond its original strict liability
setting).
142 Compare Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (noting that public
welfare offenses criminalize conduct which a reasonable person should know is subject to
stringent regulation and which seriously threatens public health or safety), with Sayre, supra
note 22, at 720 (contrasting "regulatory" offenses in which the public interest is clear and
substantial while the individual interest is limited to a small fine, with "true crime" in which
the public's injury is indirect and limited to one victim while the individual defendant is
threatened with imprisonment). See Jeremy D. Heep, Adapting the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MiNN.
L. REV. 699, 702-10 (1994) (distinguishing between the "original" RCO doctrine, applied to
strict liability statutes, and modem decisions which seek to apply the doctrine to offenses
with mens rea requirements).
143 See, e.g., Zipperman, supra note 98 (arguing that hazardous materials pose a threat to
the public welfare which justifies extension of RCO liability). See also Finn, supra note
126, at 554 (arguing that there is no "sound method" by which courts could determine which
offenses pose the greatest danger to the public).
'44 Compare United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)
(holding that possession of
an unregistered hand grenade under the National Firearms Act is a public welfare offense)
with Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609-20 (1994) (holding that violation for
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Thus the public welfare classification is subject to widespread
judicial manipulation. 45
The most fundamental objection to the use of the public welfare
doctrine to circumscribe RCO liability is that it fails to account for
the unique factual context of corporate crime. Because access to the
facts constituting a violation is the key to liability,146 controlling
significance should be given to the defendant's corporate position,
because it governs his exposure to the facts of corporate operations
and the identity of the principal violators. By contrast, in the classic
public welfare case, there is no principled basis for presuming that a
particular defendant has access to the relevant facts. For example, in
Staples v. United States, the Supreme Court found no basis to
presume that an average gun owner has sufficient expertise to
recognize whether a semiautomatic firearm had been converted into a
machinegun.147
By contrast, in a hierarchically organized
corporation, with its defined divisions and delegations of authority, it
makes more sense to create a presumption that officers in a
responsible relationship know some facts about the activity of their
subordinates.148 In fact, such a presumption is already implicit in
possession of unregistered machine gun under the National Firearms Act was not a public
welfare offense because guns are not sufficiently dangerous to alert owners to the possibility
of strict regulation).
145 See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 612-13 n.6 ("Our decisions suggesting that public
welfare offenses require that the defendant know that he stands in 'responsible relation to a
public danger,' in no way suggest that what constitutes a public danger is ajury question. It
is for courts, through interpretation of the statute, to define the mens rea required for a
conviction.") (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281).
146 See, e.g., id. at 622 n.3 (1994) ("The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only
of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related
presumption, 'deeply rooted in the American legal system,' that . . . 'ignorance of the law or
a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."') (citing Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); Liparota,471 U.S. at 422 n.3 (holding that
in order to prove defendant knowingly made an illegal use of food stamps, the government
must demonstrate that the defendant both understood the law and recognized the facts which
made the action illegal).
147 Staples, 511 U.S. at 615 ("[1]n the Government's view, any person who has purchased
what he believes to be a semiautomatic rifle or handgun, or who simply has inherited a gun
from a relative and left it untouched in an attic or basement, can be subject to imprisonment,
despite absolute ignorance of the gun's firing capabilities, if the gun turns out to be an
automatic.").
148 This is not to suggest that all corporations are the same, or that one theory explains
corporate decision making. See generally Note, Decision Making Models and the Control of
Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976) (discussing various models of corporate
decision-making). The inquiry of the "responsible relationship" should be highly factspecific, tailored to the circumstances of each corporate defendant.
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discussed

above. 49
'
IV. THE MODERN RCO DOCTRINE: OFFENSES WITH MENSREA
REQUIREMENTS
A. ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS

In the typical RCO environmental case, the prosecution presents
circumstantial evidence that the defendant had some knowledge of an
environmental violation, but lacks proof that the officer authorized
the illegal activity, as in United States v. Iverson. 5 The defendant,
who was president and chairman of a chemical company, was
convicted of violating the Clean Water Act, 5 ' which prohibits
"knowing" discharges of pollutants into protected waters.'52 The
defendant's subordinates had cleaned drums containing hazardous
waste, allowing toxic wastewater to run into the municipal sewer
system.' 53 The evidence indicated that the defendant knew about at
least some of the discharges, because he was present during some of
the cleanings and could observe or smell the hazardous waste.' 54 But
the defendant did not personally discharge all of the wastewater, and
his occasional presence at the scene of the discharges does not prove
that he authorized them, or that other officers had no role.'55 The
149 See

supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text (discussing the liability of officers in
small corporations).
150 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
' 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
152 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (imposing criminal penalties for "knowing" violations of
the Act).
153 Iverson, 162 F.3d. at 1018-19.
154 Id.
155 Arguably, the evidence permitted the inference that the officer authorized the illegal
discharges; tellingly, the defendant allegedly told employees that, "if they got caught, the
company would receive only a slap on the wrist." Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1019. In addition,
the evidence showed that at some times the defendant had personally discharged the waste.
Id. at 1018. But as noted previously, evidence that a corporate officer personally
participated in one illegal act does not establish that he participated in all of the illegal acts
charged. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Va. 1976) (reversing
conviction of company president where the state could not prove that the defendant
authorized all fraudulent requests for reimbursement even where one request was so proved).
Cf United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[W]hile knowledge of prior
illegal activity is not conclusive as to whether a defendant possessed the requisite knowledge
of later illegal activity, it most certainly provides circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
later knowledge from which the jury may draw the necessary inference.").

AMIAD KUSHNER

[Vol. 93

district court had instructed the jury that it could impose liability if
the following elements were proved:
"(1) the defendant had knowledge of the fact that pollutants were being discharged to
the sewer system by employees ... ; (2) the defendant had the authority and capacity
to prevent the discharge of pollutants to the sewer system; (3) the defendant failed to
prevent the on-going discharge of pollutants to the sewer system.156

This instruction masterfully applied the RCO doctrine to a
statute with a mens rea requirement, because it permitted the
imputation of the illegal acts of subordinates to a responsible officer
while retaining the statute's requirement that the officer have
culpable knowledge." 7 Thus, the jury could conclude that the officer
had authorized the violations even without proof that he had
personally participated in the illegal cleanings or performed some act
in furtherance of the violation." 8 In demonstrating that the defendant
was a "responsible corporate officer," the prosecution had to
demonstrate that he had authority over the activity which gave rise to
the violations and failed to stop them. 59 As in Park,6 ° it was not
necessary to show that the defendant had an express corporate duty to
oversee the illegal acts (i.e. the cleaning of the drums) or that he in
fact controlled this activity. 6 '

This application of the RCO doctrine to crimes with mens rea
requirements 6 ' has not been accomplished by judicial fiat. Rather,
156 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1022.

157 The Clean Water Act on its face imposes liability upon "responsible corporate
officers," incorporating the RCO doctrine. See id. (noting that the term "person" under the
Clean Water Act includes "any responsible corporate officer") (citing 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(6)).
...Id. at 1026 ("[T]he 'responsible corporate officer' instruction relieved the government
only of having to prove that defendant personally discharged or caused the discharge of a
pollutant.") (second emphasis added).
"9 See id. at 1025.
60 In Park, the RCO doctrine functioned to impute the criminal acts to an officer who

had ultimate authority over sanitation, but did not actually control day-to-day sanitation
management. It was not necessary to prove that Park knew the warehouses were illegally
unsanitary. But in Iverson, the prosecution had to prove that the defendant knew that a
pollutant was being discharged.
161 See id. at 1022-23 (rejecting a "narrow" interpretation of RCO liability which would
require either an express duty to oversee the activity in question or actual control of the
activity).
162 This application has not been limited to environmental crimes. See, e.g., United
States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that where a meat
misbranding statute requires intent to defraud, a corporate officer may be liable for the
violation upon proof that he had fraudulent intent and either personally participated in the
violation or had a responsible relationshipto it).
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Congress has expressly indicated that the persons subject to liability

include "responsible corporate officers," as in the Clean Water Act.' 63
A growing number of state environmental statutes also expressly

incorporate RCO liability.'64 As the Ninth Circuit concluded in
Iverson, when Congress specified that a "person" subject to criminal
liability could include a responsible corporate officer, it meant to
incorporate the RCO doctrine.' 65
Thus, the modem RCO doctrine would impose a duty upon
responsible officers to prevent violations which they know of One
who stands in a responsible relationship to a violation, and knows of
the conduct constituting the violation, is vicariously liable as if he
had carried out the act. Therefore, the modem RCO doctrine requires
three elements as stated by Iverson:
66

violation,1
(1) the officer knows of the conduct constituting the

(2) the officer stands in a responsible relationshipto the conduct, and
(3) the officer fails to prevent the conduct.'

67

When this doctrine is compared with the general requirements

for "aiding and abetting" or accomplice liability, the principal
difference is that the RCO doctrine substitutes a "responsible
relationship" for the traditional "act" requirement, as illustrated
below:
and
The accomplice knows of the perpetrator's criminal objective,

168

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). Although the statute does not define "responsible corporate
officer," it should be viewed as an implicit delegation to courts of authority to define the
content of that term. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Lenity And Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 347, 367-81 (arguing that Congress can delegate criminal lawmaking
authority to courts); id. at 414 ("Congress drafts criminal statutes in broad terms not because
it favors limitless statutory coverage, but because it is unable or unwilling to specify the full
content of criminal statutes ex ante.").
164 See, e.g., Alabama Water Pollution Control Act, ALA.CODE § 22-22-1(b)(7) (1975)
(defining "person" to include "responsible corporate officer"); COLO.REV.STAT.ANN. § 25-7122.1 (5)(b) (West 2002) (same).
165See Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1023 ("Because Congress used a similar definition of the
term 'person' in the [Clean Water Act], we can presume that Congress intended that the
principles of Dotterweich apply under the [Clean Water Act].").
163

166

See infra note 169.

162 F.3d at 1022.
This element describes the culpability of the accomplice with respect to the result

167 Iverson,
168

CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, at 329-330
(distinguishing between assisting the perpetrator's conduct, and knowing or intending to
further the criminal result of that conduct). The corresponding requirement under the RCO

which the perpetrator seeks to achieve. See
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the accomplice commits an overt act in order to assist the perpetrator's conduct.'

69

The RCO doctrine thus supplants the traditional rule, discussed
in Bourgeois, that an officer cannot be criminally responsible for the
act of a subordinate unless he completely controlled his conduct. A
responsible relationship is a sufficient proxy for evidence of

authorization.
B. LIABILITY FOR PER SE VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT: A
PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THE RCO DOCTRINE TO ECONOMIC
CRIMES

The RCO doctrine has never been applied to antitrust violations,
but it could. In a price-fixing prosecution, the primary issue is

proving that the defendant officer participated in an illegal
agreement. Assuming that the class of price-fixing at issue is per se
illegal,"v° it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to
restrain trade, 7' but only that he intended to enter into the agreement

doctrine is that the defendant officer know about the "result" of subordinates' conduct. For
example, in Iverson, the court required that the defendant officer know that the subordinates
were discharging pollutants. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. Depending on the
statute at issue, there may differing requirements as to which facts the officer must know
about to be liable. See, e.g., Barbara DiTata, ProofOf Knowledge Under RCRA And Use of
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 7 FORD. ENVT'L. L. J. 795, 800-07 (discussing
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's knowledge requirement, which is ambiguous
with respect to whether the defendant must know that material is hazardous or whether a
permit is required).
169 For aiding and abetting liability to attach, the accomplice
cannot assist the perpetrator
by accident, but must know or intend that his acts assist the perpetrator's conduct. See
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, at 333 (arguing that the "better view" is that the accomplice
must purposefully assist the perpetrator's conduct). By contrast, the RCO doctrine is
predicated on the absence of any affirmative assistance, so there is no culpability
requirement relating to such assistance. See supra note 96 and accompanying text
(discussing the absence of an "act" requirement). Instead, the doctrine imposes a duty upon
officers to investigate and prevent violations.
170 The Supreme Court has created some exceptions to the per se illegality of pricefixing. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1979)
(holding that price-fixing for the purposes of introducing a new product is not per se illegal).
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(holding that restraints on price and output imposed by an athletic association are not per se
illegal because most of its regulatory controls justifiably foster competition among amateur
athletic teams).
171 Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 667
(2001) (noting that antitrust plaintiffs need only show intent to carry out a price-fixing plan
and do not need to show that the plan was directed at achieving monopoly profits or another
goal).

2003]

RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERDOCTRINE

709

at issue. 172 In other words, "if a defendant intends to fix prices, he

necessarily intends to restrain trade., 173 But proving that the officer
participated in an illegal agreement is difficult. It is often the case
that senior corporate officers plan a price-fixing conspiracy, yet leave
the actual execution of the conspiracy to subordinates. 174

Yet a

corporate officer can only be liable if it is proved that he authorized,
175
ordered, or helped to perpetrate the conspiracy, a difficult burden.
As we have seen, it is extremely difficult to prove the officer's
authorization of illegal acts carried out by subordinates. 176 There
must be strong evidence which would allow a reasonable jury to infer
that the officer agreed to participate in the conspiracy, 177 such as the
fact that the defendant officer attended meetings at which elements of
the illegal conspiracy were discussed.178 Although at least one court
has refused to permit a corporate officer to escape liability by
claiming that a conspiracy was conducted by subordinates without his

knowledge, 179 the majority rule is that evidence of knowledge is
insufficient. Rather, the prosecution must prove that the officer
"consented" to the conspiracy, so that conviction cannot be based on
"purely passive behavior."''8

172 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 & n.59 (1940)
(holding that the Sherman Act prohibits the mere act of conspiring to fix prices, irrespective
of whether defendants had the power to accomplish their objective).
173 United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 670 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Evidence at
trial indicated that the details of the plan were arranged by upper management, but that all
sides recognized that their corporate superiors remained in control of the deal and would be
called in to settle any unresolved disputes.").
175 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962).
176 See supra Part I.
177 United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676, 683 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1981).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174,
188 (3d Cir. 1970) (affirming conviction of company president liable where he attended
several meetings at which price-fixing agreements were reached); United States v. H & M,
562 F. Supp. 651, 678 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (imposing liability where defendant president
attended two meetings at which prices and customer allocation were discussed, including
one meeting at which municipalities were allocated by actually drawing names from a hat).
179 United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979) ("When a company president has knowledge that his company is involved in a pricefixing conspiracy and takes no action to stop it, he may not insulate himself from liability by
leaving the actual execution of the scheme to his subordinates ... If this were not the rule,
the highest corporate officers would, in effect, be beyond the reach of the antitrust laws even
when their companies are actively engaged in price fixing.").
ISo United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Thus the key issue is creating a nexus between the corporate
officer and conspiring subordinates, such that the subordinates'
participation in the conspiracy might be imputed to a senior officer.
This is precisely the problem addressed by the RCO doctrine. If the
RCO doctrine were applied in the antitrust per se context, courts
could allow the officer's participation in the conspiracy to be imputed
to him upon a showing of (1) a responsible relationship; (2)
knowledge that his subordinates were involved in the conspiracy; (3)
a failure to prevent the conspiracy. Such a result would comport with
courts' repeated observation that illegal conspiracies cannot
realistically be conducted without the knowledge of senior
executives."'
V. CONCLUSION: IS THE RCO DOCTRINE AN UNWARRANTED EXPANSION
OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY?

The RCO doctrine fills a doctrinal gap in the criminal law of
corporate officers.
Whether imposing criminal liability upon
corporate officers is the best means of controlling corporate crime, as
a policy matter, is beyond the scope of this Comment. Two
concluding observations, however, are appropriate in order to clarify
the purpose of the doctrine.
First, the RCO doctrine does not create any new crimes. Its
function is to assign responsibility for conduct which has already

been criminalized by statute. 182

It performs this function by

181Kadish, supra note 5, at 431 n.35.
182This is particularly true in the context of "white-collar crime," an area in which the
scope of unlawful practices is uncertain.

See, e.g., OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G.
§5.04[1] at 5-29
(1990) ("Business crime statutes are not 'known' in the same way that lay people 'know'
about murder or robbery. Legal uncertainty... in the views of experts is a good indication
that the line between lawful and unlawful conduct is uncertain."). It is important to note
that, because the RCO doctrine incorporates the mens rea requirement in the
underlying statutory scheme, it would require a showing of scienter in a securities
fraud case. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)
(holding that liability for securities fraud requires a showing of intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud). Unlike public welfare cases, where the officer need only
know of the conduct at issue (e.g. that his subordinates are dumping toxic waste)
and is presumed to know that it is harmful, in a securities fraud case the
prosecution must prove that the officer knows that the conduct is harmful to
investors. For example, assume that the defendant officer is charged with issuing
misleading statements in public filings. In such a case, the prosecution would have
to prove that (1) the officer knew the critical "facts," i.e. the content of the relevant
statements and the fact that they were to be included in public filings; (2) the
officer knew that the statements were materially misleading or deceptive. In this
MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES
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reformulating the common law requirement of a criminal act.' 83
Instead of isolating a criminal actus reus, the doctrine seeks to extract
criminal responsibility from a pattern of bureaucratic control.
Conceding that documented authorization of a crime is unavailable,
the doctrine focuses on a responsible relationship to the conduct of
subordinates. The prevailing assumption is not that a new crime
should be created, but that responsibility for an existing crime should
not be evaded.
Second, the RCO doctrine provides a less costly alternative to
the vicarious liability of corporations. The recent conviction of
Arthur Andersen, which had 27,000 domestic employees, illustrates
the high costs of corporate liability.'84 Like the RCO doctrine,
corporate criminal liability is one response to the difficulty of proving
that corporate officers authorized criminal acts.18 But convicting the
entire corporation imposes higher social costs than convicting the
officers who are truly blameworthy. If current doctrine makes it all
but impossible to prosecute sophisticated crimes by corporate
officers, then the doctrine should be changed. The corporation
should not pay the price for the antiquated state of the law. If it is
true that "the only way in which a corporation can act is through the
individuals who act on its behalf,"' 86 the law must isolate the
individuals who are responsible.

hypothetical, the critical advantage of the RCO doctrine is that the prosecution need
not prove that the officer created, authorized, or ratified the statements in any way.
Instead the doctrine would impose a duty upon the "responsible" officer to have
prevented the issuance of the statements.
183 See supranote 6 and accompanying text.
184

See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y.

Times, June 16, 2002.

185 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Close Corporationsand the CriminalLaw: On "Mom
and Pop" and a "Curious Rule," 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 189, 193 (1993) (noting that the ease

with which wrongdoing can be concealed in an organizational setting is another reason
corporate criminal liability is recognized).
186 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
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